Report to health facilities Scotland: Queen Elizabeth University Hospital and Royal Hospital for Children Glasgow risk of fire spread on external envelope of building by Kilpatrick, A. et al.
Report to health facilities Scotland: Queen Elizabeth University Hospital and Royal
Hospital for Children Glasgow risk of fire spread on external envelope of building
Kilpatrick, A.; Sanderson, I.; Salzer-Frost, K.
Publication date:
2018
Link to publication in ResearchOnline
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Kilpatrick, A, Sanderson, I & Salzer-Frost, K 2018, Report to health facilities Scotland: Queen Elizabeth
University Hospital and Royal Hospital for Children Glasgow risk of fire spread on external envelope of building.
Glasgow Caledonian University, Glasgow.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please view our takedown policy at https://edshare.gcu.ac.uk/id/eprint/5179 for details
of how to contact us.







Report to Health Facilities Scotland 
Queen Elizabeth University Hospital and Royal Hospital for Children Glasgow 




























Report to Health Facilities Scotland 
 
Submitted to:  Tom Steele 
   Health Facilities Scotland 
   3rd Floor Meridian Court 
   5 Cadogan Street 
   Glasgow, G2 6 QE 
 
 
   Phone  0141 282 2055 
   Email:  tom.steele@nhs.net 
 
 
Date:   January 2018 
By: School of Engineering and Built Environment 
Glasgow Caledonian University 
5th Floor George Moore Building  
Cowcaddens Road 
Glasgow G4 0BA 
 
  
Authors:  A.Kilpatrick, I.Sanderson, K.Salzer-Frost 
Contact Email: arki@gcu.ac.uk 














The Grenfell Tower fire (London, 2017) raised concerns about the potential for 
combustible external cladding panels, sandwich or rainscreen, to contribute to the 
rapid spread of fire on the outside of a building leading to rapid fire spread internally 
on multiple levels. Following a review of cladding systems on NHS Scotland (NHSS) 
buildings, The School of Engineering and Built Environment of Glasgow Caledonian 
University was commissioned by NHSS Health Facilities Scotland to undertake a series 
of fire modelling analyses and to provide a qualitative review with regard to external 
cladding systems on three hospitals within the NHSS Estate.  
 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the extent to which the combustible 
rainscreen cladding systems would contribute to rapid external fire spread, and 
potential re-entry, at Queen Elizabeth University Hospital (QEUH) and the Royal 
Hospital for Children (RHC) in order to inform NHS Greater Glasgow & Clyde (GG&C) 
decision making regarding actions/protection measures that might be necessary to 
ensure the safety of all patients, staff and public in the event of a fire. 
 
A qualitative examination of the materials making up the outer envelope of the Queen 
Elizabeth University Hospital was carried out. The construction of all of the external 
envelope elements under consideration, are deemed under the Building (Scotland) 
Regulations to be at least ‘Low Risk’; however not all are deemed to be ‘Non-
combustible’. Aluminium Composite Materials (ACM) panels form part of the external 
element of the Queen Elizabeth University Hospital (QEUH) but these are only 
accessible from the podium roof at fourth floor level.  It is therefore considered highly 
improbable that malicious or accidental ignition of the ACM panels will occur. 
Part of the external cladding of the Royal Hospital for Children (RHC) was identified as 
not  having the correct cladding system installed, as specified, and this is scheduled to 
be replaced with cladding to meet the original specification. 
Both QEUH and RHC have a high standard of passive and active fire protection 
together with highly trained staff to ensure that all patients, staff and public can 
evacuate safely in the event of fire. 
 
Computer modelling was carried out using the software Fire Dynamics Simulator 
(FDS). Fire scenarios that involved the ignition of the ACM cladding from a room fire 
at QEUH were modelled. These indicated that the cladding was ignited by a fire plume 
that was external to the building.  However, conditions in the rooms above the fire 
plume had become untenable prior to ignition of the cladding. There was no 
significant lateral spread of fire along the façade, therefore adjacent rooms are 
unlikely to be affected by the scenarios that have been considered. 
 
It is noted that for the fire modelling to generate conditions for external spread of the 
fire, and ignition of the cladding, it was necessary to assume that: 
i) the automatic sprinkler system failed to operate, 
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ii) the furnishings in the room did not comply with the requirements of SHTM 
87 and that the fire load was significantly greater than is realistic in normal 
operational conditions, 
iii) there was no active intervention/action to prevent/mitigate fire growth. 
 
It is the conclusion of this report, based on the outputs of the fire modelling scenarios 
undertaken, that in the event of an internal fire the fire spread associated with the 
ignition of the cladding will not contribute adversely to the risk to occupants first 
affected in rooms close1 to the fire or to their safe evacuation.  
 
On the basis of the findings of this report, and advice from other sources, NHS GG&C 
made the decision to: 
i) replace areas of combustible rainscreen cladding at the Queen Elizabeth 
University Hospital,  
ii) replace areas of installed combustible thermal insulation with non- 
combustible insulation at the Royal Hospital for Children. 
 
The decisions were made in the context of providing additional precautionary 
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1 Qualitative Review of Building Envelope Combustibility 
 
 Overview 
There was significant concern, following the fire and loss of life at Grenfell Tower (London, 
2017) about the potential for external cladding panels, sandwich or rainscreen, to contribute 
to the rapid spread of fire on the outside of a building leading to rapid fire spread internally, 
through re-entry, on multiple levels of a building. The detailed analysis of the sequence of 
events, the dynamics of fire spread and the contributory factors at Grenfell Tower are under 
investigation. In the interim it is noted that, whilst ACM cladding panels are evidently, from 
the evidence currently available, a contributory factor to the Grenfell Tower tragedy, there 
are a number of other factors that, to different degrees, could have contributed to the fire 
spread, and rate of fire and smoke spread, through the building.  
The other factors include, but are not limited to, the effectiveness of cavity barriers, fire 
stopping, fire doors, detection and alarm systems and fire load within the building: both 
contents and forming part of the structure. 
The materials used for insulation, or to maintain the rigidity, of ACM panels will, if they are 
cellulosic/polymeric, burn2. The chemical composition of these materials, which can be 
modified, will determine ease of ignition and/or ability to sustain combustion in a ‘real world’ 
situation. However, these attributes are classified in fire engineering codes and the Building 
Regulations as the outcomes of standard test(s) and not ‘real world’ performance of elements 
of construction3. 
Health Facilities Scotland (HFS) commissioned the University to review the design and 
construction of the external envelope of the Queen Elizabeth University Hospital and the 
Royal Hospital for Children and to evaluate the implications for fire spread of the use of 
Aluminium Composite Material (ACM) panels as the external cladding. This qualitative section 
provides a report to inform the quantitative scenario analysis and the discussions with HFS 
and decision making by NHS GG&C. 
 ACM panels form part of the external element of the Queen Elizabeth University Hospital 
(QEUH) However, ‘combustible’ materials form part of the external envelope of the building 
where ACM panels are not the rainscreen cladding (e.g. behind external glass panels). 
The construction of all of the external envelope elements under consideration, are deemed 
under the Building (Scotland) Regulations to be at least ‘Low Risk’; however not all are 
deemed to be ‘Non-combustible’. 
The project brief focusses on the implications, in the event of ignition and external spread of 
a fire involving ACM cladding, for the safety of patients, and other occupants, of the hospital. 
The probability of occurrence of a fire and it’s spread, given mitigation provisions in hospital, 




                                                     
2 the materials will chemically react in the presence of oxygen and heat and release energy 
3 materials and product characteristics are classified in terms of the results of standardised tests that do not directly 
represent performance in any ‘real’ fire or the standard/non-technical definition of words such as ‘ignitable, flammable, 







i. From level four to the roof, the QEUH adult hospital has ACM panels on four facades of 
the building with North and South faces having the same materials, CM 14 and the East 
and West having the same materials CM 9. 
ii. From level four to the roof the ‘angled out’ legs of the adult hospital are CM 1 except 
for the south west leg where the corner below the helipad is CM 11. 
 the materials CM1 and CM11 are the only areas in the Adult Hospital where ACM panels are used 
iii. On the podium, from ground to the roof over the third floor, the outer skin of the Adult 
Hospital is constructed of either a glass panel, natural stone or brick with combustible 
insulation behind (CM 2, 4, 5, 6). 
iv. There is no ACM identified in the Royal Children’s Hospital. However, there are areas 
where there is external combustible cladding with combustible insulation behind it 
(CM 3). 
v. The Royal Children’s Hospital has combustible materials for insulation behind the non-
combustible external cladding/rainscreen (e.g. CM 2, 4, 6). 
vi. The Adult Hospital and the Royal Children’s hospital are fully sprinklered therefore there 
is no specified fire resistance in the Technical Handbooks. 
vii. There is fire stopping at each floor level and around all window openings for all of the 
materials/envelope constructions of the building4.   
o Commentary 
i. There is fire stopping at each floor level and around all window openings for all of the 
materials/envelope constructions of the building4.   
a. this will prevent/mitigate against fire spread from a fire in the room through 
the window surround and into the combustible insulation.  
b. In the event that fire spreads into the space between the insulation and the 
outer cladding, irrespective of type, horizontal spread of fire along the façade 
will be mitigated by the vertical (intumescent) firestops that are compression 
fitted with the inner insulation removed before installation5.  
(the manufacturers (Lamatherm) state that for horizontally oriented firestops it is allowable for there to be up 
to a 25mm gap between the leading edge of the firestop and the external screen.  This would allow cold smoke 
to spread in the cavity but the cavity would be sealed by the expansion of the firestop before temperatures 
capable of igniting the materials open to the cavity ignite. The manufacturers state that the firestops (cavity 
barriers) have ‘Fire Resistance’ of up to 120mins) 
 
ii. Glazed windows would require to be subjected to localised direct flame impingement 
from fire in a room before failure; the inner pane of the double glazed unit would fail 
first (glass fails in fire due to stresses created in a material that is not a good conductor 
of heat, impurities and constraints caused by differential expansion). There would be 
                                                     
4 Construction Materials listed in  Appendix A: these are referenced CM ‘X 
5 as per specification, this is an assumption not verified by site inspection as this is outwith scope of the project 
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a further period of time to failure of the second pane. The evidence is that failure is 
typically partial failure of glazing. 
iii. The potential for fire spread from a fire in a room to the insulation behind the screen 
or on the external screen is mitigated by: 
a. The inner part of the exterior envelope of the building is constructed of two 
layers of 12.5mm thick tapered edge plasterboard with staggered joints 
b. SHTM 85, Fire Safety – Precautions in Existing Healthcare Premises which 
requires: existing hospitals should have at least 75% of Textiles and Furnishings 
comply with SHTM 87, Textiles and Furniture: the aim should be 100% 
compliance.  It is reasonable to expect that internal fire spread on textiles and 
furnishings is mitigated and that initial ignition is difficult. 
NHS National Services Scotland have advised that QEUH is 100% compliant 
c. QEUH has automatic smoke detection/heat as appropriate. This will alert the 
staff to a fire incident to intervene before the fire is of a size as to cause failure 
of glazing or spread from the room of origin by other means. 
iv. The largest internal/ward fire, based on compartment size, has 21 beds. Assuming that 
all fire compartment walls are appropriately constructed and service/other 
penetrations are protected this is the maximum extent to which a fire would spread 
internally and threaten external fire spread. This would only occur should if the 
sprinkler system failed to contain the fire to the room of origin. 
v. In the case of sprinkler failure and before an operating systems failure to contain a 
fire, there would be early detection and alarm. Emergency Management actions to 
extinguish the fire, evacuate patients and, if necessary, close the door to the room of 
origin would contain the fire for a considerable period of time. 
vi. The potential for a wilful fire raising attack on the external cladding is mitigated on the 





2 Fire Modelling 
Appendix B of this Report describes the fire modelling method, assumptions and outputs for 
the Queen Elizabeth University Hospital (QEUH) to inform decision-making associated with 
alternative mitigation measures in the context of the risk associated with the contribution of 
combustible cladding to fire spread and potential changes in regulatory requirements in 
Scotland. Section 3 provides a summary of the assumptions, outputs and conclusions. 
 
 




 integrity of specified passive fire safety provisions in situ, these are correctly 
maintained to prevent/limit internal fire spread 
 an internal room fire develops to flashover and sustains a post-flashover fire; a 16MW 
fire was required to model conditions that supported external fire spread 
 no active intervention/action to prevent/mitigate growth to a flashover fire (including 
failure of/failure to respond to detection and alarm in room of origin) 




Fire Modelling Outputs 
 Room Fire 
o the probability of a flashover fire sustained at 16MW, as predicted by the 
model to be required to ignite the cladding, is extremely low as this is 
significantly larger than predicted for the current/actual fire load and requires 
that there is no active intervention following detection/alarm. The probability 
of an internal fire leading to ignition of the cladding is therefore very low. 
o in conditions where the combustible cladding became involved due to an 
internal room fire spreading out through the windows(s) the ignition of the 
cladding is predicted to occur after the fire had made conditions untenable in 
the room of fire origin and in the room(s) above. The ignition of the cladding 
would not have a significant impact on conditions in the upper room or on 











 the risk to occupants first affected in rooms close6 to the fire and their evacuation 
would not be adversely affected by involvement of cladding in the fire. 
 on the basis of the qualitative  analysis and the outputs of the fire modelling it is 
concluded that the external cladding does not constitute an additional life safety 
hazard to occupants first affected in rooms close6 to the fire in the event of a fire. 
 
 In the context of providing additional precautionary measures, and ensuring the 
highest level of protection, for key regional and national assets the following decisions 
are supported 
o replace areas of combustible rainscreen cladding at the Queen Elizabeth 
University Hospital,  
o replace areas of installed combustible thermal insulation with non- 
combustible insulation at the Royal Hospital for Children 
 
 
Large Scale Testing of Fire Spread Involving the Cladding 
 it is not considered that large scale testing would provide additional information that 
would materially change the evaluation of the impact of combustible cladding on the 
fire hazard/risk at the QEUH. For large scale testing to provide useful information a 
number of tests for different scenarios would be required, including internal and 
























                                                     








Appendix A Construction Materials
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1.1 Queen Elizabeth University Hospital Room Fire 
In order for a fire in a hospital room to ignite the external cladding such a fire would need to 
be sufficiently large to cause flames to extend beyond the room of fire origin (i.e. out the 
window).  This would require the fire to become ventilation controlled, following flashover 
and ignition of all combustibles in the room.  In order for the fire to become this large, there 
are several assumptions that must be made: 
 The sprinkler system fails operate 
 The furnishings in the room are not fire retardant 
 No first aid firefighting or fire brigade intervention occurs 
 
It should be noted that due to the presence of an automatic detection and alarm system, it 
is expected that both firefighting intervention and evacuation would begin early in the 
scenario, however this has not been included in the scenario QEUH Room Fire 
1.2 Model Input Data 
In this scenario, a fire is considered that ignites in a single bed room.  A medium growth fire 
has been used, based on Table 3 of PD 7974-1 (BSI, 2003, p. 26) and the similarity in the fuel 
load to the furniture found in a hotel room.  The fire would continue to grow until it reaches 
a sufficient size to cause flashover (a sudden transition from a localised fire to the ignition of 
all exposed flammable surfaces within an enclosure (BSI, 2003, p. 5)) in the room.  The size 
of fire required to cause flashover varies based on both the size of the room and the size of 
the available ventilation. Thomas’s flashover correlation (BSI, 2003, p. 29) has been used to 
estimate the fire size required for flashover in several rooms in Table 1 below.  Then, based 
on a medium growth fire, the time after ignition for the room to reach flashover is 
determined. 



























5 5 2.7 4 1.5 3542 543 
8 8 2.7 6 1.5 5769 693 
10 10 2.7 7 1.5 7182 774 
 
It is noted that as pyrolysis is not modelled by Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) models, 
including FDS, this prediction is not possible to make via computer modelling. 
After flashover, the fire becomes ventilation controlled (i.e. the size of the fire is limited by 
the available oxygen).  Equation 33 of PD 7974-1 (BSI, 2003, p. 37) Uses the calorific value of 
the fire load, and the mass burning rate of the fuel to estimate the Heat Release Rate (HRR) 
of the fire at this stage.  The mass burning rate of the fuel is estimated using equation 35 of 
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PD7974-1 (BSI, 2003, p. 38) and the dimensions of the ventilation source.  For the purposed 
of this scenario, it is assumed that there is full fallout of the window in the room of fire 
origin at the time of flashover.  A calorific value of 20 MJ/kg has been assumed based on an 
average of the values in Table 10 of PD 7974-1 (BSI, 2003, p. 37) in producing  
Table 2 below, which provides examples of  the HRR of ventilation controlled fires. 
 
Table 2 HRR of ventilation controlled fires 
Window Width (m) Window Height (m) 
Heat Release Rate of 
Ventilation Controlled Fire 
(MW) 
4 1.5 13.2 
6 1.5 19.8 
7 1.5 23.1 
 
It is noted that as the combustion is predominately outside the room at this point in the 
scenario, the exact HRR is not a critical factor, so long as there is a plume outside the 
window to ignite the cladding.  In order to minimise the computation time (in general, larger 
fire require longer computation time), a fire of 16MW has been chosen as this will be 
sufficient to create a fire plume emanating from the window.   
The ignition temperature of polyisocyanurate is 445°C (Hasemi, 2016).  The aluminium 
surface would have lost a significant proportion of its strength at this temperature as the 
melting point of aluminium is in the range 550-600°C and it loses roughly 50% of its strength 
at 200°C (O'Connor, 2016, p. 3257).  It was considered conservative to allow the cladding to 
ignite while the aluminium would be partly intact, therefore the cladding is considered to 
ignite at 450°C 
The panes of the double glazed window of the upper room are considered to break at 
300°C.  Cracking of glass is primarily due to temperature differentials across the glass (BSI, 
2011, p. 118), therefore it is anticipated that the windows will break due to flame 
impingement from the external plume and the temperature at which the window would 
break is not critical to this analysis.  The glass is considered to completely fall out to allow 
the maximum ingress of smoke and hot gases from the fire in the room below.   
Conditions in the room above the fire are assessed based on smoke in the room being 
tolerable to staff, as patients who cannot self-evacuate are expected to be bed bound and 
below the head height of the staff.  Based on a willingness to move through smoke, the 
room is considered to be untenable if the visibility is reduced below 10m (BSI, 2004, p. 15), 
or the temperature within the room exceeds 60°C (BSI, 2004, p. 17). 















Table 3 - FDS Model Input Data 
Design Fire 16MW 
Fire Location Initiated in a bed, burning predominantly occurs in the 
window plume 
Ventilation Window 6m x 1.5m 
Window considered to break at 300°C, correlating with flame 
impingement 
Run Time 3600 s (1 hour) 
Tenability 60°C, visibility 10m 
Cell Size 0.25m 
Key Events  Time fire becomes ventilation controlled (taken to be time 
of flashover) 
 Time for ignition of cladding 
 Time for window in upper room to break 
 Time to untenability of upper room 
 










1.3 Model results 
As expected, the fire became ventilation controlled and the combustion occurred mainly 
near and beyond the window of the room of fire origin, as shown in Figure 2, below.  The 
cladding ignited approximately 3 minutes after flashover, as shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4.  
However, by this time, conditions had already become untenable in the room above the 
room of fire origin. 
Figure 5 shows that the window of the upper room break to due flame impingement 
approximately 20 seconds after the fire flashes over in the lower room.  At this time a 
significant quantity of smoke enters the upper room through the broken window and the 
visibility drops below the tenability limit in approximately ten seconds (i.e. 30 seconds after 
flashover) as shown in Figure 6.  Due to the heat of the gases entering the room, the 
temperature tenability criterion is reached approximately one minute after flashover (see 
Figure 7 and Figure 8). 
At the end of the simulation time (one hour after ignition), the temperature in the upper 
room is approximately 400°C, as shown in Figure 9 
 
 
Figure 2 Location of Combustion after the fire becomes ventilation controlled at approximately 5 
minutes of simulation  
(NB that due to the lack of ability to model flashover, this does not indicate that actual time 




Figure 3 Ignition of the cladding approximately 3 minutes after flashover 
 
 












Figure 5 Breakage of the upper room window occurred due to flame impingement approximately 
20 seconds after flashover 
 
 










Figure 8 Temperatures within the upper room reach the tenability criterion approximately one 




Figure 9 Temperature in the upper room at the end of the simulation period (note that the 
temperature in the lower room is underestimated due to the focus of the modelling on the 
external plume) 
1.4 Discussion 
In the scenario modelled, the cladding was ignited by a fire plume that was external to the 
building. The cladding ignited approximately 3 minutes after flashover in the room of fire 
origin, which resulted in a fire plume being attached to the external wall.   
In order for a fire to reach flashover (and produce an external fire plume), it is noted that 
there would need to be sufficient combustible material in the rooms (i.e. the furnishings in 
the room are not fire retardant) and no first aid firefighting or fire brigade intervention 
occurs. Additionally the sprinklers would have to have failed to control the fire. 
In all cases, conditions in the rooms adjacent to the fire plume had become untenable prior 
to ignition of the cladding.  There was no significant lateral spread of fire along the façade, 
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